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Abstract
This paper discusses the implications of overconfidence when it affects a mon-
etary policy-maker. We consider two forms of overconfidence: the illusion of pre-
cision and the illusion of control. Embedding them in a standard New Keynesian
framework, we derive the optimal term length of a central banker and examine how
it depends on the types and degrees of overconfidence. In particular, we show that
the legal mandate should be lengthened when these two types of biases increase
concurrently.
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1 Introduction
Overconfidence among policymakers is recognized as a very prevalent phenomenon, es-
pecially among top-level managers (DellaVigna, 2009). Central bankers today would
certainly belong to such a category. Although the behavioral science literature has iden-
tified many different types of biases, overconfidence is probably one of the most prominent
types to affect monetary policy-makers as Kahneman (2011, p. 219) states: “the person
who acquires more knowledge develops an enhanced illusion of her skill and becomes
unrealistically overconfident.” In our view, monetary policy-makers are all the more sus-
ceptible to fall under this behavioral trait of becoming overconfident, if only because
“[t]he people who have the greatest influence on the lives of others are likely to be opti-
mistic and overconfident, and to take more risks than they realize (Kahneman, 2011, p.
252).” With monetary policy an important tool of today’s macroeconomic management,
it would be unthinkable for central bankers not to have fallen prey to overconfidence.
Such a behavioral trait has been well-documented in a large literature, which covers a
wide range of decision-makers from hedge-fund managers to marrying couples. However,
when it comes to monetary policy-makers, the literature is quite sparse. A notable
exception is by Claussen et al. (2012), who look at the workings of a monetary policy
committee whose members suffer from overconfidence and analyze its impact on the
resulting monetary policy. They also show how certain organizational structures mitigate
the issue of disagreement that are more likely to occur among overconfident policy-makers.
In contrast, our analysis here investigates the macroeconomic consequences of mone-
tary policy decisions made by a single overconfident policy-maker. Given the influences of
overconfidence, we focus on the legal term length that a society should give to its central
banker. As we discuss below, overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the economic
performance, yielding no straightforward answer as regards the optimal time length.
The socially optimal term length for central bankers has in particular been studied
by Waller and Walsh (1996) and Lin (1999). In contrast to these previous works, we
consider the issue in a forward-looking New Keynesian framework, and add the influ-
ences of a central banker’s overconfidence. More precisely, we integrate into the modern
macroeconomic model two specific types of overconfidence biases. The first one is of
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the “illusion of control”-type (DellaVigna, 2009), where a decision-maker believes that
his/her current action has a stronger influence on the future economy than it actually
has. This bias encourages the central banker to attempt to influence the economy in a
more significant way. The second type of overconfidence bias we consider is often called
the “illusion of precision”. Under this trait, the central banker thinks that he/she is more
able to process the information, and can assess more precisely the actual size of a shock
that hits an economy.
This study contributes by formally modeling the behavioral biases and deriving their
consequences. It not only shows how the impacts of such overconfidence proceed through
the whole macro-economy, but it also helps to understand an empirical puzzle, as central
bankers, even though their institutions tend to become more similar (Crowe and Meade,
2007), still have different term lengths in their mandates and actual turnover rates (Hayat
and Farvaque, 2011, Dreher et al., 2008, 2010).
In effect, our results indicate that the overconfidence biases of a central banker can
have important impacts on the performance of an economy, which justifies the reassess-
ment of the optimal term length of a central banker. First, in a forward-looking frame-
work, the “illusion of control”-type of overconfidence has a lasting harmful impact, while
the other type of overconfidence has a positive effect. Second, even though the two bi-
ases have conflicting consequences, we show that their combined impacts should induce
a longer optimal term length in our framework. We also show that, when the output gap
in the economy becomes more persistent, the optimal term length should be extended in
the presence of overconfidence, whereas it should be unchanged without it.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up a standard New
Keynesian model on which our analysis is based, and also describe how this framework
is modified to account for the overconfidence of a central banker. The following section
addresses the issue of determining the optimal term length. Then, in section 4, we obtain
a series of comparative statics results with respect to exogenous variables and briefly
discuss their policy implications. The final section concludes the article.
3
2 The Model
2.1 The Macroeconomic Model
Our argument relies on a workhorse New Keynesian model, as is described in e.g., Froyen
and Guender (2007) and Walsh (2010). This facilitates comparison with the earlier
literature and also ensures that our conclusions do not rely on non-standard assumptions.
Specifically, the economy is summarized by the forward-looking Phillips curve and the
New Keynesian IS curve:
pit = βEtpit+1 + κyt + εt, (1)
yt = −α (it − Etpit+1) + Etyt+1 + υt, (2)
where pit denotes the inflation rate at time t, β the discount factor, Et the expectations
operator, κ the degree of price rigidity, yt the output gap, it the policy rate, and α is a
positive parameter. Moreover, εt and υt are, respectively, cost and demand shocks that
are independently and identically distributed (in particular, we assume εt ∼ N(0;σ2ε)).
Assuming customarily that the stabilities in the inflation rate and the output gap
are appropriate objectives of monetary policy, the central banker attempts to minimize
a quadratic expected loss function of the form:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
pi2t+i + λy
2
t+i
)
, (3)
where λ denotes the relative weight given by the central banker to the output gap stability.
In a discretionary regime, the central banker attempts to minimize the loss value
of a single period in (3) subject to (1), which gives the first-order condition for loss
minimization as:
pit = −λ
κ
yt.
By using the fact that the shock persists over time, i.e., Etyt+1 = ρyt, where ρ < 1 is the
degree of persistence of the shock (see Walsh, 2010), one gets the equilibrium inflation
rate, pi∗t , as:
pi∗t =
λ
λ (1− βρ) + κ2 εt. (4)
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Then, the expected value of the one-period loss function is equal to:
L∗ =
1
2
(
λ
[λ (1− βρ) + κ2]2
)(
λ+ κ2
)
σ2ε . (5)
2.2 An Overconfident Central Banker
The literature on overconfidence identifies several distinctive types of behavioral traits
(DellaVigna, 2009). Here, we focus on the two specific traits that seem quite likely to
affect a central banker: the first relates to a positively-biased estimation of one’s own
influences, giving rise to an illusion of control, while the second concerns a supposed
higher capacity to extract and/or interpret information in any given situation, which is a
bias related to an illusion of precision. In our overconfidence setting below, we consider
that these two forms of overconfidence coexist.1
More specifically, as for the illusion of control type of bias, we assume that the central
banker mistakenly believes that he/she has a better assessment of the “deep” parameters
of the economy. In our framework, this bias intervenes through the persistence parameter:
0 < ρ < ρ¯ < 1, (6)
where ρ is the actual value of the persistence parameter and ρ¯ is the overconfident central
banker’s assessment of this deep parameter of the economy. This belief in a stronger
influence of his/her current action upon the future economy results in a higher degree of
manipulation of monetary policy instruments in the current period.
Concerning the information gathering and processing ability, we assume that the cen-
tral banker makes a judgment error in perceiving the volatilities induced on the economy
through the cost shock. Specifically, the subjective estimate of the variance of the shocks
by the central banker is stipulated as:
εˆt ∼ N
(
0;
σ2ε
γ
)
, (7)
where γ (> 1) represents the significance of this bias held by the central banker.2
1We do not consider a third type of overconfidence, the over-placement (or “better-than-average”)
effect, as it does not particularly influence managers. See Benoˆıt and Dubra (2011).
2A key difference from Claussen et al. (2012) is that, although they introduce a degree of overconfi-
dence of the latter form, their model does not consider the first type of judgment bias.
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As a consequence, the equilibrium inflation rate and the expected value of the one-
period loss of the economy under an overconfident central banker are respectively equal
to:
piOCt =
λ
λ (1− βρ¯) + κ2 εˆt, (8)
LOC =
1
2
(
λ
[λ (1− βρ¯) + κ2]2
)(
λ+ κ2
) 1
γ
σ2ε , (9)
where the superscript OC identifies the presence of overconfidence. As can be seen by
comparing (5) and (9), overconfidence of the central banker has two opposing effects on
the economy as a whole.
The first effect, stemming from the illusion of control parameter, ρ¯, is a negative one
as it increases the expected value of the period-wise loss function. The mechanism can
be explained intuitively as follows: as the central banker overestimates the persistence
of the output gap shock, as is stipulated in (6), and, given that he/she has a forward-
looking behavior, he/she would seek to influence the future of the economy. In effect,
the central banker has a tendency to overindulge in manipulating its policy instrument.
For example, confronted with a positive output shock, he/she increases the policy rate
substantially in order to tame any inflationary pressure. This increases the instantaneous
volatility of the economy, i.e., we have: ∂L
OC
∂ρ¯
> 0. The overconfident central banker
accepts this immediate costly consequence of the policy move so as to benefit from a lower
future volatility of the economy, conditionally on the occurrence of future unpredictable
shocks. All in all, the illusion-of-control bias imposes an immediate cost on the economy,
which suffers from a higher volatility in the policy rate, and, consequently, higher actual
volatilities of the output gap and the inflation rate.
The second effect comes via the illusion of information precision bias, which is captured
by γ in (7), and it is a positive one, meaning that it decreases the value of the loss function,
as L
OC
∂γ
< 0. As the central banker judges the cost shocks to be smaller than they really
are (more precisely, he/she considers them to belong to a smaller interval), he/she under-
reacts. In other words, this type of bias induces less frequent and, potentially, smaller
changes in the policy rates to offset any shock, a behavior that results in lower volatilities
of the inflation and output variables, and thus reduces the expected value of the period-
wise loss function.
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Because of these two conflicting effects, overconfidence by itself has no systematically
adverse (nor positive) effect on the economy, and a trade-off emerges in setting the optimal
term length of a central banker when both of these behavioral traits are present.
3 The Optimal Term Length
In addressing the issue of the optimal term length, we suppose that the expected inter-
temporal social loss is different from the loss perceived by the central banker in the
following two aspects. Firstly, there is some fixed cost associated with replacing an
incumbent central banker with a new one, F . This cost can be associated with the
search, hearings, and other processes involved during the hiring procedure. Secondly,
we assume that there is some societal cost that grows over time while the same person
is in the office, C(j) = cj−1, where c > 1 and j denotes the number of the periods for
which a banker holds the policy-making position. The latter cost can be associated with
increased rent-seeking activities or to informal pressures that come with an increased
proximity to politicians, as is exemplified by chairmen at the Fed (Axilrod, 2011), for
instance, and sets in from the second period on. In total, the “global” loss function
to the society, G (T ), consists of the discounted sum of the one-period loss value, i.e.,
E0 (Lt) = E0 (
∑∞
t=0 β
tLt), where Lt is the relevant one-period loss, and also of these two
additional costs to the society.
3.1 The Case without Overconfidence
In the absence of overconfidence, the expected loss value of one term that spans T periods
is written as:
Λ (T ) = L∗ + F + β(L∗ + c) + β2(L∗ + c2) + . . .+ βT−1(L∗ + cT−1), (10)
where L∗ is the value given in (5). This can be simplified to:
Λ (T ) =
T−1∑
t=0
βtL∗ + F +
T−1∑
t=1
βtc,
or:
Λ (T ) =
[
1
2
(
λ
[λ (1− βρ) + κ2]2
)(
λ+ κ2
)
σ2ε
]
1− βT
1− β +
(
βc− βT cT )
1− βc + F. (11)
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The socially optimal term length (T ∗) can be determined by considering the timing
of appointing a new policy-maker in light of the discounted loss function over the infinite
time-horizon, G (T ). The global loss function writes as:
G (T ) = Λ (T ) + βTΛ (T ) + β2TΛ (T ) + . . .
= Λ (T ) + βT
{
Λ (T ) + βTΛ (T ) + β2TΛ (T ) + . . .
}
. (12)
This can be rewritten as:
G (T ) = Λ (T ) + βTG (T ) ,
and, therefore:
G (T ) =
1
1− βT · Λ (T ) . (13)
Since the value of (13) has to be minimized in order to define the socially optimal term
length in the absence of overconfidence, T ∗, we impose the condition, ∂G(T )
∂T
= 0, which
gives:3
1
(1− βT ∗)2
[
λ (λ+ κ2)σ2ε(1− βT )
2 (λ (1− βρ) + κ2)2 (1− β) +
(
β − βT ∗cT ∗)
1− βc + F
]
βT
∗
ln β
− 1
1− βT ∗
[
λ (λ+ κ2)σ2εβ
T ∗ ln β
2 (λ (1− βρ) + κ2)2 (1− β) +
(
βc ln β − βT ∗cT ∗ ln c)
1− βc
]
= 0, (14)
which must hold for the optimal term length, T ∗.
3.2 The Case with Overconfidence
Overconfidence emerges, starting from the second period in office, as we suppose that in
the first period of his appointment a central banker does not exhibit an overconfidence
bias.4 Furthermore, we consider that overconfidence sets in from the second period in
office and remains as long as he/she assumes the position. Thus, in the first period, a
newly appointed central banker is completely free from the behavioral bias, but he/she
will be aﬄicted with overconfidence after this initial period.
3For simplicity, we ignore the integer problem, as in Waller and Walsh (1996) and Lin (1999).
4Thus, we basically consider that the overconfidence in this case is something one acquires after he/she
spends a certain period of time in office and not a trait one carries over from a previous position.
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For each newly appointed central banker, the social inter-temporal loss can be written
as a function of the legal mandate (T ). In particular, we write the loss of one term that
covers the length of T periods as:
ΛOC (T ) = LApp + F + β(LOC + c) + β2(LOC + c2) + . . .+ βT−1(LOC + c), (15)
where the superscripts respectively denote the appointment period (App) with LApp ≡ L∗
in (5) as its period-wise loss value, and the subsequent periods (OC ), where overconfidence
exists. This can be re-expressed as:
ΛOC (T ) = LApp + F +
T−1∑
t=1
βt(LOC + ηc), (16)
or:
ΛOC (T ) =
1
2
(
λ
[λ (1− βρ) + κ2]2
)(
λ+ κ2
)
σ2ε + F
+
[
1
2
(
λ
[λ (1− βρ¯) + κ2]2
)(
λ+ κ2
) σ2ε
γ
]
β − βT
1− β +
(βc− βT cT )
1− βc . (17)
Just as in the previous subsection, the global loss function is written as (13). Combining
the global loss function with (17) and differentiating with respect to T , we obtain the
value of the optimal term length for this overconfidence case, T ∗∗, which must satisfy:
1
(1− βT ∗∗)2{[
λ (λ+ κ2)σ2ε
2
[
1
(λ (1− βρ) + κ2)2 +
β − βT ∗∗
γ (λ (1− βρ¯) + κ2)2 (1− β) ] + F
+
(
βc− βT ∗∗cT ∗∗)
1− βc ]β
T ∗∗ ln β} − λ (λ+ κ
2)σ2εβ
T ∗∗ ln β
2γ (λ (1− βρ¯) + κ2)2 (1− β) (1− βT ∗∗)
+
(−βT ∗∗cT ∗∗ ln β − βT ∗∗cT ∗∗ ln c)
(1− βc)(1− βT ∗∗) = 0. (18)
Thus, the equation (18) implicitly determines the value of T ∗∗.
Having obtained (14) and (18), we are now ready to obtain comparative statics results
with respect to some exogenous variables.
4 Comparative Statics Analysis
In order to obtain comparative statics results, we rely on the implicit function theorem,
applied to (14) or (18), depending on the presence of overconfidence. Let us denote (14)
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and (18) as Z = 0 and ZOC = 0, respectively. As we focus on the range of the term
length which is optimally defined by these first-order conditions, we make use of the
second-order conditions for loss minimization, and basically examine the signs of the par-
tial derivatives of the relevant first-order conditions to see how each exogenous variable
affects the optimal term length in these two respective cases. First, we look at the impact
of each type of bias individually.
Lemma 1. An increase in the the degree of the “illusion of the precision”-type over-
confidence of a central banker increases the duration of the socially optimal term length.
Proof. The sign of the partial derivative of ZOC with respect to γ is:
∂ZOC
∂γ
=
λ2 (λ+ κ2)σ2ε ln β · βT ∗∗
2γ2 (−λ+ λβρ¯− κ2)2 (βT ∗∗ − 1)2 < 0. (19)
At T ∗∗, the second-order condition for minimization of the loss, i.e., ∂Z
OC
∂T ∗∗ > 0, must hold.
Hence, we can obtain the following:
dT ∗∗
dγ
= −
∂ZOC
∂γ
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗
> 0. (20)
Q.E.D.
As the greater “illusion of precision”-type overconfidence lowers the one-period loss value
as in (9), an increase in γ actually raises the benefit of keeping an incumbent central
banker.
The next result is related to the “illusion of control”-type of overconfidence.
Lemma 2. An increase in the the degree of the “illusion of the control”-type over-
confidence of a central banker decreases the duration of the socially optimal term length.
Proof. The sign of the partial derivative of ZOC with respect to ρ¯ is:
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∂ZOC
∂ρ¯
= − λ
2 (λ+ κ2)σ2ε ln β · (−βT ∗∗+1)
γ (−λ+ λβρ¯− κ2)3 (βT ∗∗ − 1)2 > 0. (21)
Then, similarly to the above lemma, we can obtain the following:
dT ∗∗
dρ¯
= −
∂ZOC
∂ρ¯
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗
< 0. (22)
Q.E.D.
As can be expected from the one-period loss value of (9), an increase in the value of
ρ¯ leads to a shorter optimal term length. More frequent replacement of central bankers
becomes more attractive as the loss value from the second period onward increases due
to this type of overconfidence. This is a quite contrasting result to an increase in the
degree of the “illusion of precision”-type overconfidence. Thus, when the two types of
typical overconfidence to a central banker both increase or decrease at the same time, we
must be aware of the relative magnitudes of these changes in determining if an incumbent
policy-maker should be kept in the office a little longer or not.
In order to answer this question more precisely, we focus on a case where an increase
in overconfidence of a central banker implies the increases of the values of γ and ρ¯ by the
same percentages. Under this supposition, we can derive the following clear-cut proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1. When both types of overconfidence increase by the same magnitudes,
the legal mandate should be lengthened.
Proof. In order to make a comparison between the effects of the changes due to two
different types of overconfidence, we first convert the derivatives in (19) and (21) into the
respective elasticities, ηγ and ηρ¯:
ηγ =
∂T ∗∗
∂γ
· γ
T ∗∗
=
(
−
∂ZOC
∂γ
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗
)
· γ
T ∗∗
, (23)
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ηρ¯ =
∂T ∗∗
∂ρ¯
· ρ¯
T ∗∗
=
(
−
∂ZOC
∂ρ¯
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗
)
· ρ¯
T ∗∗
, (24)
Then, the combined effect, Ω, can be measured by the sum of these two elasticities:
Ω = ηγ + ηρ¯ =
(
− 1
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗ · T ∗∗
)
·
(
∂ZOC
∂γ
· γ + ∂Z
OC
∂ρ¯
· ρ¯
)
. (25)
Using the expressions in (19) and (21), we can get:
Ω =
(
− 1
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗ · T ∗∗
)
·
(
λ2 (λ+ κ2)σ2ε ln β · βT ∗∗
2γ (−λ+ λβρ¯− κ2)2 (βT ∗∗ − 1)2
)
·
(
1− βρ¯
2 {λ(βρ¯− 1)− κ2}
)
,
(26)
which is always positive for the loss-minimizing T , i.e., T ∗∗. Q.E.D.
This proposition implies that, when the magnitudes of γ and ρ¯ increase by the same
percentages, it is necessarily the case in our framework that such a increase in overcon-
fidence calls for a longer term length. Therefore, if the relative significance of the two
types of overconfidence is unchanged, the optimal term length should always be increased
when an incumbent central banker becomes more overconfident, irrespective of the exact
values of the other variables.
Additionally, we have the following comparative statics result concerning the actual
persistence of the output gap in the economy.
Proposition 2. As the output becomes more persistent, the optimal term length should
be extended only under overconfidence.
Proof. The signs of the partial derivatives of Z and ZOC with respect to ρ are respectively:
∂Z
∂ρ
= 0, (27)
∂ZOC
∂ρ
= − λ
2 (λ+ κ2)σ2εβ
1+T ∗∗ ln β
(−1 + βT ∗∗)2 (−λ+ λβρ− κ2)3 < 0. (28)
Thus, we can obtain the followings:
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dT ∗
dρ
= −
∂Z
∂ρ
∂Z
∂T ∗
= 0, (29)
dT ∗∗
dρ
= −
∂ZOC
∂ρ
∂ZOC
∂T ∗∗
> 0. (30)
Q.E.D.
While the increase in ρ does not affect T ∗ without the “illusion of control”-type over-
confidence, this increases the optimal term length in the presence of the overconfidence
because this change in fact lowers the cost of having an overconfident central banker
in office by reducing the gap between ρ¯ and ρ. This effectively reduces the degree of
overconfidence.5 Indeed, as ρ¯ is strictly less than one, even the value of ρ¯ for the most
overconfident central banker is bounded from above. This also raises the issue of consid-
ering how the optimal term length had been set initially. If it is determined by taking
the effect of this overconfidence into account, the legal mandate should be lengthened as
the output shock persists in a greater scale.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our results indicate that the overconfidence biases of a central banker can have important
qualitative impacts on the performance of an economy, which justifies the reassessment
of the optimal term length of a central banker. In a forward-looking framework, the
“illusion of control”-type of overconfidence has a lasting harmful impact. On the contrary,
the “illusion of precision”-type overconfidence has a beneficial effect by inducing lower
volatilities in output and inflation levels. Our results show that concurrent increases in
these two types of behavioral biases by the same percentages should always induce a
longer optimal term length in our framework.
In this paper, we exclusively dealt with a single policy-maker. In reality, though,
almost all the major central banks have adopted committee systems in making important
5This argument does not work if ρ¯ is pushed up proportionally as ρ increases.
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monetary decisions. It would be interesting to examine the effect of overconfidence of the
sorts we analyzed here in a richer organizational context.
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